

Olivia Ryan: Okay. Today is June 27, 2006. Do you mind stating your name?

Rafael Ebron: Rafael Ebron.

Olivia Ryan: And Rafael, when did you begin using computers, or how did you develop your interest in technology?

Rafael Ebron: It would probably be with the Mac when I was very young, so the Oregon Trail and doing the whole thing with the turtles with Mac 2, I guess, and you had the little floppy disks. And it was probably, like, second grade or so. And it was one of those things where we just kind of grew up with computers, even though it was, like, the old computers that really didn't do much except playing maybe that game and word processing. And, you know, we had the dot matrix printers and things like that. So that's how I kind of got started. And then we got—you know, as you got older it was just—the technology just got better and better. And I think I was on Prodigy in 1987. We got this 200-baud modem from Egghead software and it was, like, the biggest, coolest purchase that we got. We connected to the web—or, not the web at the time. Just this online service. And, you know, you start playing around. And just that curiosity when you're at a young age trying to see what's going on and what games were there, you know, and what you could just do. And, you know, that's kind of how I started.

But it wasn't anything from a code level. It was more kind of like on an application level and just general interest in computing. And then we had, like, in '87 I remember this pretty distinctly, because I, like, wrote about it, we had, like, an IBM PS/2. And it was only really good for word processing, but just that, you know, that you could just kind of dig around and play around with it little bit more. It was kind of—it was pretty cool.

Olivia Ryan: Cool. And did you have any formal computer training or [computer education]?

Rafael Ebron: Not at all. So I had no formal computing education whatsoever. And when I was in Boston University for college, I was in the process of—because I had an accounting degree of all things but somehow turned out to be the computer guy. Again it's just because of just we grew up with it, daily use. I mean, I don't think I started—when I first—I remember this, when we first got to college—I don't think I had email until college. I guess this was '94. Because before then there was no one to email. There really wasn't. It was like, "Who am I going to email?" There's nobody on this thing." And so I got my first email address in college, and then I—someone showed me Netscape Navigator. It was, like, 1.0. And it probably was Mosaic at the time, too, and I just thought that it was just part of what all the computer—what you get at college. Because there was all these other applications that I'd never seen before. It was all the UNIX competing platforms, all the different applications there, and I had never seen that before. So

I just thought, "Okay, here's Mosaic and, oh cool, you could type in this thing and it takes you there and you get all this information."

I didn't think anything of it until it got to be bigger and bigger in use and you saw it evolve. So I was downloading Navigator, you know, all the way through. And it was pretty—it was tough back then because it was, like, an hour download on this 288 thing, and it would stop, and you'd be like, "Ah, I've got to start over again." And then you'd just do it over again. But, you know, it was neat. It was that—what got me was just that first, for the web anyway, it was that first experience where it's like, "Wow, it's all here." And I think—so there's really two things that I saw that was kind of neat. One was—I had met this woman at school, and she was from Somalia. And I just looked up Somalia on the web, and I found out all these different things about it that I would never have found otherwise. And so the next day it was like, "Let me tell you about Somalia."

And so that was the coolest thing. And then the second thing was stockmaster.com was really a very early one. It was really on the money side of things. And this was one of the things that changed, or really we saw the value of the web instantly just through this website because they were giving you data that you couldn't find—or you could find it in the newspaper, but then with the newspaper you had to flip through it. With this it was like, "Boom, wow. This is pretty amazing. I can buy that stock, and that's going to go up," and all this. It was pretty neat. So it was pretty evident early on that the web was going to just go crazy. And so I just had that interest in it.

And then so in college I went with the accounting degree but I was going to—I was going to hang out and do a management information systems degree. But then, you know, I just cut it short. And I talked to my accounting professor and he said, "Well, why don't you just go back home, you know, and try to find a startup to go to or, you know, computer folks need folks in accounting too or have that background." And so I kind of came with that mentality and so went back home and somehow landed a job.

Olivia Ryan: And where did you first work?

Rafael Ebron: So I actually started at an accounting firm here, Stonefield Josephson, just down the block on Montgomery Street. And we were doing a gig—so that was my first job—first job out of college. I did it for, like, six months or so. And accounting was not something I really wanted to do. And I was carpooling in, and a guy told me about dice.com. It's this website for tech jobs, and so I put my resume in there, and someone from Netscape had picked me up, or had picked up my resume, and so I interviewed down there. It was funny because we actually had a gig down there to do an accounting gig down in Mountain View, and it was right across the street from Netscape. And so when we first drove by it you saw the big fountain and you were just like, "Oh my gosh, this is Netscape." And it was, like,

the coolest thing. And then again that week or, you know, maybe a couple weeks later I got that call for Netscape.

And then so I left the steady job of accounting and went to Netscape, and this was in '98, as a contractor, and it was with a management accounting piece, a management reporting piece. And so we did that. So that's how I started. And it was funny because it was right when the AOL merger was happening. And the interesting thing is if you're not in the industry you have no idea what's really going on in these companies, right? And so I had no idea that Netscape was acquired by AOL and that all the Netscape engineers were leaving and didn't want to be there. So it was going to be a different place altogether. So I kind of just joined not knowing, and then when I joined I actually got laid off a month after because of that AOL transition. And then they got me back in a month later. And so I did mostly—you know, I got a full-time job there and I kind of moved up the ranks as far as—really more from attrition [laughs] of—AOL just did a number on the engineers for some reason. I mean, just—I think that was kind of the start of the bubble bursting. And so every year there was one or two layoffs, and it was just restructuring and restructuring, and so. And I kind of moved on. I moved from the—is this—?

Olivia Ryan: Mm-hmm. Yeah.

Rafael Ebron: So I moved on from the kind of the management reporting piece. Did that for about a year or so. And so what I would do would be taking a look at all the different metrics that the company was doing more on the management side. So Netscape browser market share, what is, you know, the page views for Netscape.com. So all the different metrics. Working with all the different Netscape.com people as far as getting deals done and projecting deals out. So was a lot of—it was a lot of reporting but also a lot of projections and things like that for business development.

And then from there what was interesting—well, what got me into kind of the browser game—so at that point Mozilla was still—Mozilla did start. I was tracking them just through my normal management reporting type pieces. So seeing how they grew. And we were mostly—what I was doing mostly was again really focused on Netscape browser, and that time that's when also that was kind of when the big decision of moving away from the Netscape Navigator suite, the 4.x series, over to the Mozilla code base. So there was a lot of that, and so I kind of saw that whole thing transpire. It was pretty interesting.

Olivia Ryan: And how did that—did that affect your job at—?

Rafael Ebron: Not really. It was more of my involvement in—my involvement when Mozilla started at that point just from a personal level, because they were kind of disconnected. Because Netscape was really Netscape, and Mozilla was still

Mozilla. And they were still kind of two different tracks. And so my involvement with Mozilla would just be to download the daily builds, report bugs and things like that. And it was really rough at the time. And so if you're downloading dailies at the time, you were pretty hard-core because nothing worked. And you saw—and it crashed all the time, and it just sucked. And you saw it evolving, and it was pretty neat. I mean, there's these big evolutions, and you can see—when you're downloading the dailies every day, you kind of don't see the progress if you were someone who downloaded one day and then downloaded, like, six months down the line. So it was kind of neat to see some of these little things. And you would—you know, and you'd hear an engineer landing something, and you'd be like, "Okay, I want to go check that out, see what's going on." Or you have this—you download something and then it's just crashing and crashing and you just can't wait for that engineer to fix it, and you download the next one. And so that was kind of my involvement in it.

My involvement in—my involvement changed from a work level when I started doing product management versus the management reporting piece. Because what I was seeing was—because again we were having a lot of this attrition at work. Because I had, like, insight into the numbers. The numbers kind of tell you what's going on. So I was able to interpret some things, and that's how I got into product management where I was like, "Well, you know what? If you look at these numbers we need to be focusing on this." And there was just no one around to do that focusing on this type of thing.

Olivia Ryan: And what year was this?

Rafael Ebron: This was about—it was still '98, '99 when I made that transition. And wait, was it—yeah, '99, 2000 when I made that transition. And I started doing product management, and it was all browser-related type things pertaining to the browsers. So I worked on, like, the browser central which was, like, the launch page for, you know, how to download the browser. And then, like, the plug-ins area, the theme park at the time, where you could download Netscape 6 themes. And just the smart update piece which was—which is now I guess we have an update system too with Mozilla.

So what's neat, too, is seeing how all the things that we did is still happening now, but it was really rough when we did it. So there's just a lot of learnings that we took and made it better. So we had—

Yeah, we had a lot of—I mean, we were doing the same things that we're doing now, or Mozilla's doing the same things that we were doing seven years ago, but it's just better because we've learned so much from back then. So, you know, the whole web 2.0 thing, we kind of launched that thing when we reset Mozilla on this new Gecko base, right? So I kind of think that's when it started. But if you look at it, you know, Browser 2.0 it's Firefox. When we did, like, the extensions,

which is kind of the big feature for Firefox, well, that's really plug-ins from Netscape Navigator 2.0. And so we've just evolved a lot of these things. And then because early on too a lot of the structure, it was just a moving target. So themes and plug-ins and extensions and all those things weren't great in Netscape 6.0 because kind of the foundation of it was still kind of moving. And so we did all that way, way early. And now it's like the foundation's so solid that, you know, you can do all these things that we're doing now, and the speed is there, the performance is there. Before it just wasn't.

So that's how I kind of got into it. And then I eventually moved into being a product manager for the Netscape browser, and that's when I really got involved in Mozilla because—and that's where I met Asa and all those other guys. And at the time of course there was—there is the Mozilla versus Netscape type of thing, too. And that was becoming a little uncomfortable, and I was seeing that from kind of the project managers ahead of me who were kind of leaving the group, because it was kind of evolving into its own product. People were downloading Mozilla over Netscape, and they preferred it. Or there would be features that would make it in Mozilla and not in Netscape, or a different implementation. And—

Olivia Ryan: So you were all working on both?

Rafael Ebron: We were all—yeah, because it was all—it was essentially one thing. I mean, you look at—you did everything on Mozilla. Or, you know, what the engineers would do is they would do everything on Mozilla. There would only be a subset of things that would be Netscape proprietary, and that would be on its own kind of branch. But you'd do everything on Mozilla and then you'd kind of brand it to be Netscape eventually and add on those other things. And Mozilla couldn't be all those other things we thought anyway because well, to complete the browser you need to have all this other stuff, which is kind of the packaging, the support, the download infrastructure, the deals. And that was probably the biggest one, because Mozilla wasn't an entity to do deals. So with Netscape, sure, we need Flash, we need X, you know, software in order to make this happen. Like, one of the big ones was a spellchecker for all things, right? It's like, okay, they can't do it because there isn't an open-source spellchecker at that time. And so, but Netscape had a spellchecker that was licensed from a certain company. And so it was slightly better because of that.

So the deals, that's gone away because of course Mozilla as its own entity is making deals. But then of course it's still kind of a touchy subject to say, "Who do you deal with?" And, you know, like, that, you know, that's still kind of touchy.

Olivia Ryan: And how are those decisions generally made?

Rafael Ebron: Those right now are done by—well, right now it's John Lilly who's business development but also through Mitchell, but then also through the community. I mean, the community really again, at the end of the day, decides who the deals—who we should deal with. I was involved with several of the deals that Mozilla did. It was with, you know, the Googles, the Yahoos and some of the others. But it's different. Business development is different in Mozilla land. I don't know if you've interviewed John Lilly yet, but it's backwards. And he says it best. He crystallized it. In traditional it's revenue first, right? In any partnership or in a business development thing. Revenue, and then it makes sense for the partnership. I think with Mozilla it's user experience is key, is, like, the top priority. The second piece is distribution for them. And then the third piece of course is just, you know, if there's any revenue, great, you know. Just to sustain themselves. And it's not like a gouge as you would with any other business development job, you know. It's pretty upfront. They're very select.

I don't think there's very many deals at Mozilla right now. And, I mean, the companies that Mozilla has to work with have to be kind of conscionable, too, you know. They have to have some sort of conscious. And they have to just understand the open-source piece and what they're really getting into. I know the—it's a tough job that John has because it's—Mozilla is a weird company. It's just strange. And the reason why it's unique too—and it just—it could be very just unique in general, like, as opposed to other open-source projects because it's so user facing and it's—there's only so many applications you want to download on your machine. And you need a web browser. But, you know, you might not need all these other open-source things or anything back-end you won't ever hear about. But because it's so front and center, it's unique that way.

But again, back to business development, it's tough because it's the transparency thing. Like, you know, what can I say about X company? And, you know, there's just can we even tell the community that we're talking to you? Can we—should we tell them that? And I know blogging too, I remember we had a meeting with a partner, and they had blogged about it. And this happened many times. Once time it was with Microsoft, and they blogged about the RSS icon, and that was just like, "Why are you blogging about meetings?" But then it's like, well, they should be because it's Mozilla, or not. You know, it's still one of those weird things, and it's not necessarily clear. But it's definitely a challenge. It's probably one of the biggest pieces, so just the whole legal aspects and things like that, it's pretty tough. It makes it unique, though.

Olivia Ryan: Yeah. So you think—?

Rafael Ebron: The one great thing about that though is everyone wants to work with you. I think the set up—you get to meet everybody. The setup is cool. The tough part is it's hard to turn—to say—because there's a lot of people out there that are just doing some messed up things that just aren't either going to make money or will

eventually get bought out by some company and it's more of a featured company. You know, like, they're developing a feature, not necessarily a company type thing that will eventually get bought up by Yahoo or Google or whatever. So it's kind of hard to say, you know, "Oh, yeah. I think that makes sense. You know, we'll include you in the browser, or we'll do some sort of partnership with you." So there's a lot of having to turn people down or advising folks to take a different direction and things like that.

But it is fun to be able to meet everybody because everyone wants to meet you. And sometimes, you know, we meet them because it's through a problem, right? It's through, "Oh, our engineers are having this issue with your browser." And it's the bus dev guy who, because the company is so small, that has to contact Mozilla or whatever to try and get that fixed. And that's how—

Olivia Ryan: Who do people—who do companies generally contact when they want to seek out—?

Rafael Ebron: It's usually through the network. The Valley's pretty small, so people know people. And then for folks who don't we're pretty responsive through just the emails. It's pretty amazing. It's not—Mozilla still acts like a very small company. There is not a lot of systems in place on a corporate level per se. I'm sure that'll change. But it'll get to somebody.

Olivia Ryan: Why do you think that will change?

Rafael Ebron: Well, I'm sure just because with the corporate structure, you know, things get a little bit more processed. So right now it's pretty much, "Email this address and you're going to get somebody to respond regardless." And it's kind of neat like that. But, you know, with a bigger company it's a form. You know, you have to sign this and sign that and tell people what you're really interested in and all that. But right now it's still pretty easy to get in touch with somebody at Mozilla. So.

Olivia Ryan: When you sort of worked in groups with people, how was the division of labor determined? Like, who decided who would work on what? I know you're in a very different position than most people and there weren't probably a lot of people who did exactly your job, too, right? Or were there?

Rafael Ebron: Well, no. I was—so for me I was the last product manager out of Netscape. Because they're—I think it was, like, 2,400 people at a time, and then it went down to, like, a hundred folks. And when I left, I left in '94, so I took—I did the Netscape 7x series. And there was no—and I was, like, the only product manager there. Before there was, like, 11 of us. And so there really wasn't necessarily a division of labor for me.

Olivia Ryan: And then what about later at Mozilla?

Rafael Ebron: For later, we were—one person that is unheralded at Mozilla is Chris Beard. He took over the product marketing, product management side. And he took over after Firefox 1.0 and really kind of just shaped everything as far as the direction for 1.5, 2.0, giving it, like, a real product lifecycle. Just doing all the things that need to get done from that level and also from an operations level, because that was—again, it was a startup. But the division of labor, a lot of it was just, you know, we all knew what needed to get done. It was just a matter of, you know, either contracting it out or getting it done ourselves. And again, it's one of those small company type feels and you—small company type things, you kind of just did everything that you needed to do.

The code level is a lot different. One of the things from a product management standpoint, kind of the work product is the PRDs or the Product Requirements Documents, and that's how we kind of do the division of labor type thing. I mean, when you're coming from a software background to—and you've been doing it for a long time, there's all these processes that just have to happen, and there's just a set of tasks that need to get done. And so mostly getting that stuff lined up and done, and doing the planning pieces, going through the Product Requirement Document, looking at all the different features, divvying it up to the different engineers, making sure the QA folks are on the same page, making sure the international folks who are doing the localizations are on the same page. But it kind of keys off of that document or a set of bugs that translates into a set of bugs that kind of get done for each release.

And so that's how the division of labor kind of gets done from an engineering standpoint to get us to a point of release. With Mozilla that's—what I just said is to get us to a point of releasing a product. With Mozilla, you can do whatever the hell you want. You know? It's just whatever interests you, you can go and do it. Like, I just left, but I can go in there and pick off a couple marketing things or put in my two cents on how a feature is getting implemented. And I actually filed a couple bugs just the other day on some things that I found on just general surfing on the web. So on that side it's more of what interests you type of thing, and that's kind of neat. So. Which you kind of run into on that stuff.

Olivia Ryan: Can you sort of describe how the marketing of the products changed over time?

Rafael Ebron: Yeah. What was very neat was taking Firefox to zero and making it fairly well-known pretty fast. And honestly I remember it was funny, they were doing the name. I was part of the naming thing. I wasn't at the company just yet. I was kind of an adviser at the time, and Bart Decrem at the time was the guy who was leading the charge on the marketing side. And they had done a brainstorm, and they were trying to come up with these names, and they all wanted to do something with the fire theme because of Firebirds. So what happened was Phoenix at the very beginning through David Hyatt and others I guess who named



it that. Phoenix is actually the name of a project for Netcenter when they doing a Netscape.com remodel, and we already had all the design stuff, so I think they might have just picked off the name and they picked off the designs and kind of went with that. Because they wanted to make things easy because it was just, you know, Dave, Blake and Asa at the time doing the Phoenix browser. So oh gosh, what was I saying? The naming.

Yeah, so they wanted to keep—so from Phoenix to Firebird. Firebird was the issue with the Firebird database project. You've probably heard this story, too. And then what was funny though when I first heard Firefox I was just like, "Are you serious? This is what you want to call this?" And I was kind of pissed at the time. I was like, "Why are we calling this thing Firefox?" And then Bart said to me, "Well, they really like it. You think we can make this work?" And I said, "Yeah, yeah, we can make this work." And then he was like—it was funny, he was like, "Well, we can make this—we can make anything work, can't we?" And it's like, "Not really. Not really." But, you know, I was starting to see, you know, Firefox, we can make Firefox work.

And so we did. With a branding piece, what we had to do was really give it some meaning. The product gave it some meaning just because of the product manifesto that was done with Blake and Ben at the time, which made browsing—made this really just a no-nonsense browser. I mean, that's really the foundation of this whole thing. And that's kind of my feeling about the Firefox browser, too. Let me take a step back, though. I forgot this bit of history. So I was leading the Netscape 7.0x release. I was actually one of the people that introduced pop-up blocking, so you guys can all thank me for pop-up blocking. That was introduced in 7.01, and it was a big deal because AOL was including this. You know, not Netscape. It was AOL. And because AOL was the big pop-up behemoth.

And so it was a big deal. It went all the way to the CEO, and it was like, "Can we put this pop-up blocker in Netscape 7?" And it was—you know, because again this was where the contention with Mozilla and Netscape started, because Mozilla introduced a pseudo-pop-up blocker in Mozilla 1.0, and Netscape 7.0 didn't have that pop-up blocker. So that's where the big contention was. So in 7.01 we introduced, like, a kind of a real pop-up blocker where we had actual, you know, UI and things like that, and then we made refinements to it. But after we did 7.01, we were like, "Okay, well, what are we going to do next?" Because all the engineers, we were, you know, time to do the next wave of the product. So we did—so we launched 7.1 which really was supposed to be 7.5, but at that point we all knew that this was, like, kind of running its legs. Like, we kind of—we tapped out. We were at 10 percent market share with the Netscape 7.X series, and it wasn't going to get any higher. It was, like, 20 million downloads for the 7.X series. And I think, what, Firefox is going to get in the 200 pretty soon?

At that point we were like, "Well, do we go with continuing this suite that only X people use the rest of the suite, mail composer and AIM, while everyone else was using the browser, and that's all they came for, or do we go this route that these guys did which is just doing a browser-only thing?" And so at that point we were like, "Well, you know what? We don't have the resources to do it." But the way that the code is done, it's really cool because all the things that—it's really broken down into two things, that browser, right? It's the front end and then the back-end interface. And I always see the browser as what it's really supposed to do is just give you—like, it's supposed to be just kind of a canvas for the web, and that's really the main thing about it. Everything else about it is kind of, you know, hoping to help support that piece.

And so at that point we had the decision of either going the Phoenix route or stripping down Netscape 7.1 or the Netscape 7.X series so that it was browser only. So that was kind of a big decision point I think, too. But again because they were both on the same code base, anything that we did was able to help out both projects, and so that was kind of cool. And so there's some features in Firefox now that we were able to introduce because of all the work that we did back then, so it's kind of neat.

That was kind of an interesting point. So anyway, that was kind of a segue into that—it was one of those things though, because what's interesting or what's the perspective that you'll get or you may get from most folks is that Netscape management was dumb or wasn't thinking about these things. I mean, we saw the numbers, and we knew where we needed to go. It was just the circumstances of the people who were there and whatnot which made us go a direction we probably shouldn't have gone, which was continue with the Netscape 7.X suite. I think—and you kind of saw this with, you know, with Netscape 8 they did go on the Firefox browser but they kind of messed it up by introducing some other stuff. But it was that understanding of, "Yeah, we really just need to do a browser-only type thing," because, you know, the browser is what people want, not all the other stuff. So that was kind of a big decision point.

Anyhow, so back to the branding, sorry for that. So with Firefox, again back to the product, when we went—again, it just exploded. We started with really the foundation of the product as kind of a marketing piece of it, where, you know, again that manifesto. But then we also kind of introduced the organization into the marketing of the product as well. So introducing, like, values and things like that. So not only was this product going to be the simple and fast browser for everybody to use, it was going to be the one that came from Mozilla that had the history from 1994 being the browser developer but—being the premier browser developer—but also the kind of the values of open source, that this browser that you're using is built by millions and millions of people and that it is—you know, has those open-source values you can trust. I think that was another main piece was introducing trust into the product, that you can—that this browser is built on

trust. You can kind of trust us to do our best on the security front, to trust us for providing a quality product to you. So, you know, we introduced that, and that really helped out.

And then the other thing too from a marketing perspective when we jumped in was, well, it was a start-up, right? So we had nobody in marketing. It was myself and Bart at the time and Asa who was more—who was on the quality side but then moved into kind of the community marketing piece. And so that's where kind of Spread Firefox came out because, well, there's no way in hell we are going to be up to do this because Microsoft's got an X billion dollar budget for marketing their products and we've got zero. And so we kind of used that same model of the Mozilla model of it being open, being transparent, you know, getting volunteers and things like that, and so that helped out a lot.

And it's not kind of a cure-all thing. People think that open source is kind of a cure-all thing, like, "Okay, we are just going to open source this, and everything is going to be good." You're going to get bad stuff, and then you're going to get one of those—one or two people that are just going to shine. And it's one of those continual things, and we've seen that happen time and time again where we just get some crappy ideas and then we get some that are just pretty brilliant and we kind of run with it and go. One was the *New York Times* ad campaign and how that evolved too again from the Spread Firefox piece. Or even this project, too. I mean, how you guys came about it is just because that we're open and you hear about us, and then you contact us and then we kind of take that idea and run with it. So that's how the *New York Times* piece happened is a guy named Rob up in Minnesota—I guess he is a PR person, so he knew how to get this done—he contacted us, and Bart had worked with him to make that happen. And then Chris finished the job and—Chris Beard finished the job and got the rest of the ad into the *New York Times*, did all the logistics and worked with Rob and Asa and Chris Messina to get the ad up in the *New York Times*.

But, you know, time and time again, we did this with the [extensions] contest, we did this with the Firefox flicks. It was just, you know, getting folks contributing and really just showcasing—and just showcasing their talents and kind of running through it. So Spread Firefox is pretty interesting in itself, and I think other folks are trying to mimic it, too. And, you know, it's kind of been—it's been written up in—

Olivia Ryan: Other projects?

Rafael Ebron: Other projects have tried. I know Opera's trying to do something like it.

Olivia Ryan: What about other Mozilla projects? I mean, has there been any discussion to not only have spread Firefox but spread any other browser or any other product?

Rafael Ebron: It's different. There is a distinction between project and product. It's really kind of strange in Mozilla land. With the products, you know, with the premier product being Firefox of course. I think Mozilla's got to figure that out still. I don't know if—I don't think necessarily there necessarily needs to be more spread-type projects. I think it kind of just—it'll happen on its own. It kind of gets to be too much, I think, to—it's definitely a resource issue, too, to manage all that. But yeah, it's—I think the Spread Firefox piece is really interesting. There is 100,000-plus people on that thing. There's lot of folks who are just there to see what's going on. A lot of—I didn't realize that there are a lot of PR people on there, too, and just news reporters on there until, you know, we had sent something to that list and, you know, a reporter asked us what it was all—what all this was about. So that was kind of neat. But then, you know, you just get all kinds.

What we wanted it to evolve to or what I wanted it to evolve to was very similar to the Mozilla project. But it's tough, because it's marketing. There isn't necessarily a work product versus code. With marketing it's kind of transient, the things that you do, and there isn't that peer network. And marketing's a little easier to get into, and there's just so many different facets of marketing that it's kind of hard to grok. Whereas code is code. There are lots of—you see it. It's pretty concrete. With marketing, you know, people think of advertising and commercials and things like that. They don't think about kind of the numbers, all the different aspects of that, just the gamut of marketing. And so it's hard to really nail down who would be a perfect contributor to Spread Firefox or have that same type of system that we have for Mozilla.org the way we do in the code.

But it is similar in a sense, because then we have—you know, in the sense of you have a core group, you have another circle, and then you have a bigger circle of people who want to contribute, and then that just huge circle that just will just go crazy and who want, you know, this to show—just give a little bit of effort to show that they're involved in Mozilla. And so we see that, and we see that in the code, too. I mean, that's kind of the person that files a bug or two but at least has a Bugzilla account. With the Spread Firefox it's that person that maybe uploads a picture, who may comment once in a while and things like that. And then there's that core group of people that are just hacking away and contributing daily and doing all sorts of different things. And they just love it. And, you know—

Olivia Ryan: So you think a core group of marketers or people devoted—people who spend a significant part of the day working on marketing is sort of necessary in order for something like Spread Firefox to function?

Rafael Ebron: Yeah, and I think this is where it's going to turn. It's when we see the—because what a lot of people forget is Mozilla, they're full-time employees. Right? I think we'll see more full-time employees working on Spread Firefox, and some already are. They just aren't so public about it because of the company because it's weird.

But I think we'll see that. Because again, it's like a case study type of thing. The things that Mozilla's doing is just crazy, and so you kind of—if you're a PR firm you want to be associated with that. Which is how this Rob guy in Minnesota, you know, sure, the name of his firm is pretty public. You know, he was in *Wired* magazine and all these other things, all these interviews. And so I think we'll definitely see more. Again—

Olivia Ryan: So you think the relationship could be similar to, like, the way there are coders working at Google, Red Hat, but working on Mozilla stuff. Is that already sort of happening?

Rafael Ebron: It is already happening. I think we'll see more. I think it's more of the joint promotion type of things, and you'll see it more of—it's tough. I think they'll still trying to—they're still trying to crystallize it. I saw poster the other day where okay, we're going to do a Marketing Requirements Document, which is one of the first documents that you create when you're building out the next version of the product. And within that you have, like, the competitive analysis, you have, like, the market segmentation, you've got all these different things within that MRD, Marketing Requirements Document. That gets translated into what I was saying before, a Product Requirements Document. But that MRD can be public, put it up on wiki, everyone can take a look at it. All the marketing folks from all the different companies should be looking at it, if they don't. And it's funny, it always—and then they can kind of contribute that way, you know, and contribute their—okay, like, "Okay, there's 10 percent marketshare here, marketshare here's bad, so maybe we should be focusing on this country." Or, "Your segmentation's off, you should be blah blah blah." Or, "Here's some more numbers. Here—" you know, things like that. Or just give that a blown-out competitive analysis on Opera. It could be some guy at Yahoo, whatever, and we already have this thing on Opera, so here it is, you know. So that's how they can contribute.

There's a couple interesting things about that, though, and the way Mozilla's becoming more—and the way Mozilla's being organized. Because again it's a nonprofit foundation, yet there's all these business things that are happening. And so does it make sense to do a competitive analysis on Internet Explorer, you know? That's kind of weird. Don't know. Probably. I mean, just to see what's going on, but there's that—because deep down there's that competitive edge that yeah, we want to kill them, in a way. But not really because that's not how it's supposed to be. But yeah, we want to be better than IE. That's just how, you know, that's how you want to work.

But we would feel—I think Mozilla would feel weird and I would feel weird if we were to get, like, 60 percent marketshare, even. [We're] not even talking about 95 percent. But, you know, I think we'd be happy—I don't know if you've had that marketshare discussion, but I think many folks at Mozilla would just be happy at 50 percent or even 30-plus. Split the pie among all—you know, all the different

browsers out there. So that's kind of unique. But again, competitive analysis is kind of thrown out the window.

Ken Albers: Do you mind jumping back for a second? You know, you've been talking about full-time employees and volunteers, and if you'd just expand a little more on, like, how much you actually think volunteers—

Rafael Ebron: Contribute?

Ken Albers: Contribute. Like, how big a role they play in both, you know, Mozilla and Spread Firefox. And also if you could—what you think draws people into the projects as well.

Rafael Ebron: Well, I think that's a good thing. I'm actually more surprised that more people aren't involved, considering how much money is involved, considering how much influence you could actually have. And I think it's just not knowing. A good example of this is search. There's this one feature, just a really basic feature, where you could, like, pre-cache the search results pages, you know, if you know what's going to be the one that—or actually any page you can pre-cache the one that you think is going to be clicked on next so that it will come up faster. It's a boon for search results pages—you know, for search companies, you know, because then it's, like, fast results. But I guess my point to that one is no one knew that you can manipulate the browser that way or that you could contribute that code to make that happen. So if I'm at Yahoo and I can see that search can be done better if you did such and such in a browser, then I can go in and go ahead and make that change and then boom, all of a sudden it works.

So again I'm surprised that we're not seeing more people involved, because again the money involved and just the ability to—the scope of influence, the ability to influence this. What gets people involved is just it's interesting. I mean, again it's that—for people who do figure it out. You can ask Blake and some of these folks who've come in very young. It's so open you can kind of explore, and you can see what's going on, and you can tinker around with it. And I don't have a coding background, but I can tell you a lot about the structure and architecture of the product just because I'm able to see what's being checked in or what's, you know, all the different components, I can search through all the different code. And they make it—they've made it—the architecture of how Mozilla is now, they've made it very simple, too. So it's much more simple to contribute.

I think the difference between the full-time versus the volunteers, it's really hard to say. I hate to say it, it's the whole long tail thing. But it's kind of true in the sense that there is no way we can get to all these things if we didn't have the volunteers. We would never have had the impact, and so they're if not—they're on par if not greater as far as contributions. But the contributions are different in the sense that the full-time folks really contribute on the core stuff, and the

volunteers are kind of working off of the core things that we built. So for instance, like, the localizations. So we'll make sure that thing's localizable, and then volunteer localizers are the ones that are going to translate and do the internationalizations and things like that. We have to do that work on the core side, but there's no way we're going to have 40 different localizations of the product. That's not possible. That's just—we had—at Netscape we had it whittled down to three, and I think we had 12 at the most, at the peak, and I think even IBM was helping us then. Now there's, like, 40 plus, and I think SeaMonkey was over a hundred. That's just incredible and, you know, just that alone is pretty big.

And then there's also—there's no way that we can manage all the different—it's complicated stuff. There's no way we can manage all the different configurations, the you know, Mac OS 10 version, blah blah blah, Linux version, whatever. There's no way to understand. We just don't have those systems, and so those folks on those systems filing those bugs are just a big help to figuring this out.

Olivia Ryan: And why do you think people volunteer? I mean, either for Spread Firefox or people who contribute to the code?

Rafael Ebron: Again, it's just really interest. There's something that you're passionate about or there's something about Mozilla that is just—it's something that you use every—I think it's that fact of you're in computer science or you found out or stumbled upon Mozilla in some way. And I don't know, maybe it's a promotion or maybe someone talked to you about it or maybe it's just a bug that's just been bothering you. But I think it's the fact that Mozilla makes it very easy for folks to contribute, and then that interest is there and it's just that little spark and it's like, "Oh, I can actually do something." It's like, "Okay, I'll follow through." And then for some it's their job.

But again, it's just we're at the beginning of the web, and for me I kind of want to see what the potential is, you know. The web, it's not necessarily—I don't know. You know, like, the web kind of—it's still kind of early right now. Some parts of me, you know, thinks the web kind of sucks, you know. It's still not there yet. And it's that potential of bringing it up to an even better level than is now and being able to contribute to that I think is what drives a lot of folks. And, you know, being able to do things. It's just amazing what people can do now. Like, you put up a blog, people contact you, a long-lost relative. We enable search. We enable all these things. Anything—you know, they talk about Web 2.0 and things like that. Well, it starts with us. I mean, we're the foundation of it. Those little—you know, the application-like experiences that people are having now with the Gmails, the calendars, the Yahoo mails and things like that, that's only happening because we put that code in a long time ago. And we've iterated on that, iterated on that, to make it so that it's a stable base for all these applications to be put on there. And now you're seeing, you know, like, an Excel-type application being

run via web. It was always that—yeah. So, I mean, that's really the interest level of folks too is I think from the Mozilla side is where we can go and what level we can take this. Because again, it's really so early. What more can we do with browsers? What more can websites do? What types of applications? If we link applications together, will we have a better experience? Will we be able to do more things? Because it's the connection between people that makes this really interesting.

And the really cool thing about Mozilla, too, is that—and that—and the only thing—that's one of the things that impressed me about Netscape as well was we were using the stuff that we were developing. So we would have the Internet site. It would be killer. It would be using Composer and things like that. This was before wikis and things like that. So were we collaborating better because we were using that? We thought so. We thought we were moving a little faster than most folks because we were able to share knowledge a little bit better. We'd take notes, we'd write them down, we'd publish them on Composer, boom, okay, everyone's on the same page. So the collaboration was there. It was kind of neat. And so, you know, can we make improvements on that? Now you're seeing Instant Messenger. You see, you know, presence on webpages and things like that. That wasn't possible way back when. Is that a good thing that now you know I'm online off of my webpage and now you can just IM me or things like that?

So I think there's still much more to do. There's a lot more issues, and Mozilla's definitely on the forefront of those. Privacy is one of those things. How much—you know, if you give back to—how much you give to websites or to the browser even. Do you get a better experience that way? So there's just definitely lots of different issues, but again, so back to the question, though. It's taking it to a different level I think is where—

Olivia Ryan: And why do you think Firefox has been able to attract such a large number of users, and what sets it apart from other open-source projects?

Rafael Ebron: This is where the challenge is going down the line. With products in general, what happens is it's—they get too complicated, and they get bogged down. And what makes Firefox unique is that it's simple and it's just the browser that you need, and that's kind of the premise. It's like, "Well, we're not—because we're Firefox or Mozilla, we're not forced to do anything bad. We're not forced to put something in here or forced to innovate. We are going to give you the best thing possible versus another company or other companies," and just that mentality of "we need to keep you upgraded, we need to keep you buying the next product, we need to put this feature in and this feature in and this feature in because that's going to sell it." And then the product gets whacked out, and it's just too complicated, and it's like oh my god. And that's kind of what happened with Netscape was it had too much stuff in it, and then when you stripped it down it's



like yeah, this is all I wanted. Because again from when I started was the browser's only there to give you the best of—it's there for the website. Everything else is kind of superficial. It's just to interact with that website experience or delivery for the Gecko browser.

So that's what makes Firefox different from a product standpoint. It's just what you need. And then you have those extensions, and if you want that, cool. Put that stuff on there and you're good to go. Yeah, so that's why it's—and I think the challenge is, and we've been—the Mozilla team and Mozilla's been doing a good job of focusing on features that makes sense that people need and not going overboard on things that only a few people need, so. And that gets harder and harder. I think down the road it's just going to have to evolve into something else. But I think there's this opportunity for either other products or other experiences to happen, and so I think Gerv said, you know, something about let a million browsers bloom or something like that. I don't remember at what point he said that. But, you know, we could see many more browsers, and maybe Firefox is the lead one. But then we have so many different experiences that people may need that maybe down the road we'll see an accessibility browser, you know. One targeted for folks who are physically handicapped. And so maybe that comes from the Mozilla group. I know—and that's a separate download.

I always think of Thunderbird as a browser, too, just different. Because it is a browser in a sense. It has the same backend. You can view websites from it. It's just different information. And so in essence we have a mail browser. So, you know, it does RSS and all those other things, and you can view websites in it. So, you know, I think down the road we'll see more products or—not necessarily from Mozilla per se but definitely more browser products, and I think it's a good thing.

Olivia Ryan: In order to sort of maintain that simplicity that you've described, do you think there needs to be sort of a small core group of decision-makers in order for it not to get sort of out of control?

Rafael Ebron: Yeah, there is, and it is Mozilla. I mean, they are small—I think there's going to be more folks wanting to be a part of that group of decision-makers and influencers, and you can influence. But I think it's still a fairly relatively small group. And I think the way that the structure is modular [indiscernible], too. The tough part is the UI. I mean, that's where all the battles happen. No one ever—there's battles over the code, like, the underlying architecture of the code, too, but it's always on the UI side because it's the user facing piece and then the deals or whatever, the companies get all mad. But definitely a small group is what's going to keep—is definitely necessary to keep Mozilla Firefox nimble.

Olivia Ryan: And how are those sort of battles played out? How are difficult decisions made?

Rafael Ebron: I don't know. It kind of just works out. There's a strong leadership there, I mean, through Brendan and Mitchell. They kind of make it happen, so, you know, people are usually—the arguments are so—I mean, the threads on these arguments can go on for so long, and it's always the—and they're always at a high level too. But people work themselves out. They reason themselves out. And there's definitely a structure, so decisions do get made eventually. And if it has to, it comes down to Mitchell and Brendan to kind of lay down the law, and you just follow what they say. At the end of the day that's really—it's kind of nice that way.

Olivia Ryan: How would you define an open-source, a successful open-source project? That's a broad question, but.

Rafael Ebron: No, an open-source project has to be interesting to make it as successful as Mozilla is and Linux as well and some of these other ones. It has to be used by a lot of folks, and so that's how it would be successful is that it's fulfilling a need and then the structure of it that people are able to contribute. So that would be a successful one, you know, that you have this community of interested, like-minded people that are able to contribute. So that would be my definition.

Olivia Ryan: And how would you list Mozilla's priorities today, and how would you compare those priorities to those in 1998?

Rafael Ebron: Oh, 1998 was just don't die. That was a—that was tough. It was a whole reset. Now it's more of—it's much more mature now, and people are recognizing it more. I think there still needs to be more recognition of it, and again it's tough on the deals. It's all—to get to where Mozilla really wants to be successful in terms of distribution, it has to do the big PC deals really is what it boils down to. But in '98 it was really just putting that foundation of contributors together and making it happen. And it was, I mean, it was pretty ugly. I've got to tell you. I mean, I didn't think it was going to happen. I mean, you saw—and there was certain jumps where—well, what's kind of neat, remember when I was telling you how, you know, you downloaded dailies, you downloaded dailies, and then you don't see the change, and, you know, it would be different from someone who downloaded once every six months or whatever. Well, how they do the code too of course is they'll take a branch of Mozilla, some of the engineers, and they'll take a branch of Mozilla and they'll work off on it on their own. And they'll just hang out on that branch and eventually port that stuff back in. And then when they actually do port that stuff in, it's like holy cow, this is amazing. And so there's certain points along that cycle where that happened. And it's happening now too on this new—on the new things that they're working on.

But there was this one I remember. It was called the—I think it was the outliner widget or whatever, the tree widget. You can ask David Hyatt or Joe Hewitt about it. But it was significant because it was like—and David Hyatt worked on

it. But gosh, I'm rambling now. But it was amazing because it was just—it was such a slow crawl when we—we tried to dog food the product, and we were using Netscape mail or Mozilla mail, and you couldn't even scroll down, it was so tough. And then he put this thing in, and it was like lightning fast and it made everything lightning fast, so the browser, when you scrolled, it was lightning fast. It was just amazing. And, you know, you had all these little chunks along the way, so it was pretty cool how that worked out.

Olivia Ryan: Do you consider open-source software projects as a public service?

Rafael Ebron: Yeah. Definitely. I'm surprised government isn't involved more than they are now, especially since they pay billions of dollars on software, and just I cringe every time a website doesn't work on a government site. And it's like, what are you doing? Honestly, it's a waste of money. It's just—they should just make Firefox really—they should invest more in Firefox, and they should make it as a standard browser that they definitely code on, because it's the only one that works on Windows [indiscernible] 10 and Linux. And in lots of different languages. And is accessible. So it's like one of those things where geez, the government just needs to get a clue. Not only that the other piece that's interesting—what people don't understand is the legacy again of Mozilla to Netscape. Netscape was huge. I mean, it was huge back in the day. And they still are interestingly enough in the government as far as, you know, like, the Pentagon and things like that because of the security, the secure mail. They're using Netscape mail. And so we inherited all that stuff too, and so it's like now it's time to transition to that. From a security standpoint there's no one that can beat us just because, well, we invented all that stuff way back when. And then it's just, you know, we have all those features for—the secure browsing, the encryption and all those different things. You can all find that with Mozilla.

Olivia Ryan: And do you think that open-source techniques can be applied to sort of other areas of production in society?

Rafael Ebron: Yes. And as I'm away from this, I think we're borrowing more from what's already out there than we're kind of giving back per se. And I—

Olivia Ryan: What do you mean?

Rafael Ebron: I think it's kind of a natural thing what's happening with open source. Just it's really more of a community aspect, and I don't know, so it's, like, I see it in some of the other communities. When I left I told Mitchell what—because I've been doing this for, like, a while, and I haven't had much of a break. And when I left Mozilla I was telling Mitchell, I was like, "You know, it will be nice to just enjoy the web for a bit, you know. Enjoy the things that we've done." Because it kind of sucks having to think of it from a different perspective of, "Oh, that website

doesn't work. I've got to go file a bug," or something like that. Or, you know, things like that. And so I've kind of been able to enjoy the web a little bit more.

And it's just kind of the different communities that I'm involved with, too. Like, there's one with community-supported agriculture, which is like the CSAs out here. It's the local organic farms. And just the way they're set up. They're very similar to how Mozilla's set up in a way in the sense of the CSA is—they're very open in telling people about fruits and vegetables, that it's not perfect. Mozilla isn't perfect, and on the farm the fruits and vegetables aren't necessarily perfect, either. We are going to give you—we're focused on taste and not the appearance of the food, and we're going to pick them as ripe as possible and get them to you as fast as we can. And we give you this newsletter. We find out what's on the farm. Oh crap, there's all this weather stuff that's been happening and so the crops are bad, and what we're going to do is try to do the best thing for you and work out with these other farms and get you a nice box for this week.

And so it's kind of like that with Mozilla in the sense of transparency and just the community building. And then, like, again with the farm, it's like, "Oh, we need to plant some—we need some new plants. Do you want to help invest in the plants?" And, you know, or, "We're starting this egg campaign, or we're going to start delivering eggs, but we need the funding to get that started." So kind of like the *New York Times* campaign where we solicited funds because we wanted to get the word out, you know. It's kind of—I think it's all out there.

So that's one piece. I think that there is a lot of already that's out there. But then the other piece is I think from a tool level all these—a lot of people can learn from this and the way it's structured. Like, I think I was telling you about gosh, if the municipality had a bug system, how cool would that be? You know, file a bug on a pothole and it will get fixed in two weeks, you know. At least they'll know. Or there's a drug dealer down the street and you need the cops over there. File a bug on that. I mean, I think that would be pretty cool, and then you actually see the line of people that need to get things done, you know. And you can see them passing the buck or whatever. You know, why can't there be a bug filed on the city budget and, you know, see who all is in there? I think there's a lot of that. I think there's a lot of things that we can, you know, learn from Mozilla in that way and the transparency and the way we work. Enabling the wikis, you know, and things like that, I think would be great for communities.

Olivia Ryan: And what if anything do you think the popularity of Firefox will do for open source, the open-source movement, either software or the larger sort of open-source movement as a whole?

Rafael Ebron: I think it will take on a life of its own. The piece that needs to be—and I don't think it's Firefox, it's more Mozilla—it's really got to be that structure, people looking at that structure and seeing what's made it successful. And hopefully

applying that structure to other things like we were saying. Because I think Firefox is great, and it's necessary, and it's going to keep evolving. It's going to get more and more popular, and people are going to see it as eventually the de facto browser that people use or that people develop on, because of all those characteristics I told you about. IE is just irrelevant because they're not on those other platforms and they're not going to get on all those different languages, and they're not going to be as fast to deliver. And they have that monkey on their backs of having to keep selling IE and adding these features and all of this stuff, whereas Mozilla doesn't have that.

So I think Firefox, Mozilla is really it. Not necessarily Firefox. You know, the focus on Mozilla and the structure and how it's become successful and that structure being applied to other things I think we'll see. I don't think Firefox will be the only application that comes out of Mozilla that's successful, and I think the—what people don't know is that Mozilla actually is used in a lot of places. Lots of different companies use it, the Yahoos, the Googles and all the other places. And weird places, too. But, you know, just that transparency and openness.

Olivia Ryan: Like, where is it being used that we wouldn't necessarily think for something maybe outside of software?

Rafael Ebron: There's a list on that site, but there is some that amazed me. I think there was, like, a lot of government agencies that are using it. And then you can also just use it as a ticket system versus a, you know, software system. So it was a—again, just transparency, the management of things. You know, our use of wikis is pretty amazing. The way we use blogs right now as a means of communication is above and beyond what people are doing, or we'll see that happening two, three years down the line of people communicating that way. And it's really neat, you know, how we—everyone essentially has their own blog and then it's aggregated on Planet and when they talk about Mozilla stuff it goes on there and then boom, we all know about what's going on because it's important stuff. And then you know if you want to find out more about them just go on there and see what they're working on. But that's still pretty much on the forefront. We'll see more.

Olivia Ryan: Okay, we want to ask some follow-up questions.

Ken Albers: Just, how would you just define the differences between working on the commercial product at Netscape and the open-source product at Mozilla?

Rafael Ebron: Well, kind of a different perspective I guess on this is how you get the people to work on what product, right? Where in commercial Netscape, you hire someone into that job because they have that qualification, and then they build that product out and—or they help spec that out via through project management or whatever. You know, you get someone from Stanford MBA and they're the product manager

for this thing and they'll tell you what the product needs to happen, what it needs to be. And again it's kind of that feature-ish thing where as a commercial entity you have to keep pushing on features and you have to do those things. And then also with deals you're just so—you're so handcuffed by having to do those.

So, you know, we were talking about—I think one of the—this is probably a good one for Joe and Blake because they'll tell you about the Netscape whore bar, which is the personal toolbar thing, and they just cram that thing with all sorts of different deals. And there was one where I think stamps—I think there's one that was stamps.com was like some sort of software that was being bundled with the browser. Which made no sense. And then there's another one with a weather bug, which again made no sense. It's like, well, I want to download a browser, not all this other crap. And I think the most—one of the more egregious—the one that they did have that was kind of cool that was too early in the game was this company called Net2Phone, which was you're able to do the call thing. Now it's huge because of the whole VoIP and Skype thing. But that was—gosh, that was a long time ago. So it's funny to see all this stuff happening now. It's like, well, we had that a long time ago.

But the most egregious was the HP Print Central. They had—on the print menu they had an icon or a link to get printing supplies. There's, like, three links and it's like, "Why is this here? This is so horrid." It's like what if they don't even have an HP printer? This doesn't make any sense. And so it was—we just put it in there. And the problem with that is it was one of those uber-deals. It was done in the AOL client. It was done in the Netscape client. It was done in the CompuServe client. So it's not like the Netscape guys who were, you know, maybe 10 percent of that deal had anything to say about it. So the product management team was really pretty handcuffed on those types of things, and the engineers just weren't happy about it. And again back to the pop-up blocking thing which was a huge deal.

So there's that piece where, you know, it's very deal-driven and it's not that way at Mozilla land. And then again it's just how people are brought into the development of the products. So with the Netscapes it's the, "Well, we're hiring into it, and you're working on such and such thing, and you have to work on such and such thing," versus Mozilla it's like, "Well, I'm really interested in such and such, like accessibility, and so I'm going to go in and focus on that. And, you know, I'll volunteer." And then those guys eventually get hired into Mozilla or they'll get hired into a company working on it.

I think one of the coolest things about Mozilla is that you don't have to work for Mozilla to work on Mozilla. We've got folks at Red Hat, we've got folks at IBM, we've got folks at—you know, the folks at Red Hat is a pretty significant chunk of work that people don't realize. They control the security module of Firefox and Thunderbird and all those things. That's pretty important. With IBM there's the

accessibility component, and with Novell, you know, there's more feature things on imaging and things like that.

But it's just amazing. There's just really no comparison because it's folks who are really passionate about it and folks who kind of have to do it. So that's really the big difference.

Olivia Ryan: Would you say the best way to if you wanted to work for Mozilla as a developer would be to start volunteering and making a name for yourself?

Rafael Ebron: Yeah, it is. It's tough. I mean, that really gives you an edge to—to start working on it. It could be something, you know, if you're a computer science student or, you know, you have some just spare cycles, hack on it. It's pretty fun. The community's good. I mean, it's talented, no doubt. I mean, this is hard-core stuff. And the things that are happening here it's just amazing. The structure of the code itself is pretty cool. It's almost like a—it's neat. It's kind of like we are on a new engine and people are realizing how fast you can drive with it now. And it's pretty solid, and folks are just taking off now. So it's pretty cool. So that's kind of how it is.

Ken Albers: Great.